Occupied Jerusalem- As the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip continues, more failures and intelligence failures are revealed in preventing the sudden attack launched by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) on the “Gaza envelope” settlements and the western Negev.
The repercussions of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle are also expanding, draining the Israeli army militarily and financially, and contributing to strengthening the unity of the arenas regionally.
On Friday, the Israeli media highlighted the failures of the security services and military intelligence in concealing information and warnings from the Israeli Army Chief of Staff, and its chief, Herzi Halevy, regarding Hamas’ preparations and readiness to launch an attack on the south.
The Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper’s “Saturday Supplement” investigation also revealed the secrecy of the Israeli Military Intelligence Division, Unit 8200 (AMAN), about information and signals monitored from the Gaza Strip in the months preceding the events of October 7, 2023.
Discretion and investigation
The intelligence information centered on the planning of the Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, to carry out a military operation in the “Gaza envelope,” which officials in the Chief of Staff and Israeli army commanders did not know about until a few days after the surprise attack.
The Commander of the Army’s Southern Region, General Yaron Winkelman, and the Chief of Staff were not informed of some of the threats, and information was concealed from them about specific warnings regarding the scenario of a Hamas military operation in the south, while the movement was dealt with “with disdain” in the months preceding the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle.
This approach to dealing with Hamas, says investigative journalist Nadav Eyal, who prepared the investigation: “What was behind Chief of Staff Halevy’s decision to create an external investigation team was that what happened in Israel about 3 months ago was more dangerous than the Yom Kippur War,” underestimating Hamas in 2023. “It was much greater than the disdain for Egypt and Syria before the October War of 1973.”
On the night of last October 6, according to what the newspaper reported in the investigation, unusual events and movements began in the Gaza Strip, and it is usual for military intelligence to warn and report the presence of “indicating signs” of an attack or war.
She added, “At the beginning of the night, an indicative signal arrives as a result of operational activity carried out by the General Security Agency (Shin Bet), which raised suspicions of the possibility of a ground attack on Israeli territory.”
Eyal pointed out that “such things have happened in the past. There was no raid, ground attack, or armed operations across the security fence with the Gaza Strip.”
Therefore, on the one hand, the Israeli journalist says: “This matter is being taken seriously, as the head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, arrives at the intelligence headquarters and consultations begin. But on the other hand, the consultations lead to the fact that it cannot be said that this is a sign.” “It is absolutely certain that there is a ground operation, or even just an attack.”
Eyal adds: “There are also chilling signs that were not taken seriously during the Shin Bet consultations, allegedly to reduce the possibility that this was preparation for an attack.”
I do not know exactly what the signals are, the Israeli journalist continues: “But I can imagine, on the one hand, a Hamas activist leaving his home in the middle of the night, and on the other hand, Israeli consultations mean that nothing will happen and end without decisions.”
“Zero time”
Hours before the surprise attack, Chief of Staff Halevy, Southern Command Commander Winkelman, and Army Operations Wing Commander, General Oded Pasiuk, ask themselves: What is happening? While at the headquarters of Unit 8200 in the south, important and fundamental matters are happening that confirm the approaching moment of zero for the attack on the “Gaza envelope.”
The Israeli military tells me, Eyal says, “As the dawn hours progress, the turmoil increases. There are more signals from the enemy in the Gaza Strip, which can be estimated to have been transmitted through Hamas’ communications networks, raising the possibility of an imminent attack on Israel.”
In the same conversation conducted by the Chief of Staff in the dawn hours, the investigation indicates that no actual signals, warnings, or information appeared from Unit 8200, nor was there any senior officer from Military Intelligence in the conversation, while the Southern Command does not know what is happening in the means of communications. Hamas, despite repeated talks during the night.
While the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle has its repercussions on the military and political arenas in Israel, and the fighting continues in the Gaza Strip, and it is not yet clear whether a comprehensive war will break out with Hezbollah on the northern border with Lebanon, in the meantime the Israeli army is waging a battle over the security budget. For the year 2024.
In light of the high cost of the war on Gaza, the Israeli army demands a budget of 95 billion shekels ($26 billion), which represents about 5% of the gross national product.
On the other hand, the Israeli Ministry of Finance opposes this, and is satisfied with allocating a maximum of 85 billion shekels, and also conditions the allocation of the budget by obliging the army to develop an austerity plan and rationalize expenditures, according to what was reported by the “Ynet” website, affiliated with the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper.
Challenges
According to Ynet’s military affairs analyst, Yossi Yehoshua, the Ministry of Finance is not in a rush to approve the increase in the budget demanded by the army, and stipulates an inventory of accounts and an investigation into matters that reveal its failure following the events of the “Al-Aqsa Flood”, and an investigation into how it was spent. Financial resources and budgets, and if they are used for their intended purpose.
A major battle is raging between the Ministries of Finance and Security. Yehoshua says: “Over the budget necessary to deal with the large number of challenges and threats on various fronts, and it is clear to all parties that what was before October 7 will not return, and a war scenario on various fronts is closer than ever.” time ago”.
The repercussions of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” were not limited to the internal Israeli scene, as the path of “unity of the squares”, which was adopted by the Palestinian resistance factions during the recent rounds of combat with the Israeli army, turned during the war on Gaza into a regional model, according to the Arab and Middle Eastern affairs analyst in the newspaper ” Haaretz Zvi Barel.
Barel believes that the Palestinian resistance model that developed during Operation “Guardian of the Walls 2” (Sword of Jerusalem) in May 2021 was adopted by the various armed factions in the region and neighboring countries, adding that – with the war on Gaza – the various fronts were united with the unity of the battlefields. Which was invented and installed by the Palestinian resistance factions.
Bar’el believes that the model of unity of arenas in the Middle East gave a higher advantage to the Arab and Islamic resistance factions in the region over America and the great powers, which enabled them to achieve achievements at various levels.
Barel pointed out that Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the armed Islamic militias in Iraq, under the auspices of the “Axis of Resistance,” were able to record achievements in their independent struggles, away from the directives of Iran, saying that “after the end of the war on Gaza, they do not intend to disappear from the scene, and they will continue to do so.” “Putting America, the great powers, and Israel facing more challenges.”
